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Step Aside, Mr. Senator: A Request for Members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee To Give Up Their Mics
PAUL E. VAGLICA *
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, a law professor at the University of Chicago Law School dubbed the
Supreme Court confirmation hearings “vapid and hollow” and added that they, as
implemented, “serve little educative function, except perhaps to reinforce lessons
of cynicism that citizens often glean from government.” 1 Ironically, this same law
professor, Elena Kagan, later endured the confirmation hearings as a nominee and
currently sits as the 112th Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 While she may be
one of the few to ever reach a seat on the High Court, she is not alone in her
assessment of the Supreme Court’s lackluster confirmation process. Other legal
scholars have called the process a complete mess 3 and likened it to a circus 4 or a
kabuki dance. 5
Although there are multiple aspects of the confirmation process that could use
reform, 6 this Note draws attention to one flaw of the confirmation hearings that
many overlook—members of the Senate Judiciary Committee (the “Committee”)
use the confirmation hearings as a forum to voice their own political beliefs instead
of focusing their undivided attention on the qualifications of the nominee. Since
senators do not focus entirely on the nominee, they are not thoroughly examining
the nominee’s fitness for the Court. As nationally televised events, it only follows
that senators use the confirmation hearings as a medium to speak to their

* J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to Professors
Charles Geyh and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer for critiquing earlier drafts of this Note and to the
staff of the Indiana Law Journal for their remarkable editing. All errors are my own.
1. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 941
(1995) (book review).
2. Edward C. Dawson, Kagan Confirmation Contentiousness Continues Partisan
Trend, HOUS. LAW., Oct. 2010, at 41–42.
3. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994).
4. See Terence J. Lau, Judicial Independence: A Call for Reform, 9 NEV. L.J. 79, 84
(2008).
5. See Richard Brust, No More Kabuki Confirmations, 95 A.B.A. J., Oct. 2009, at 39,
39.
6. See, e.g., JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 10 (1988) [hereinafter TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE] (suggesting that television cameras be banned from the hearings); Stephen L. Carter,
The Confirmation Mess, Revisited, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 962, 965 (1990) (stating that inquiry
into a nominee’s ideology threatens judicial independence); Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 38 (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court nominees should state how they would
have voted in cases that the Court has already decided); Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of
Ideology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 131 (2009) (advocating for a confirmation process that delves into a
nominee’s ideology).
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constituents. One may ask why this matters or point out that one would expect this
of senators; 7 after all, senators constantly have their campaigning caps on,
especially when receiving national attention. However, these responses ignore the
negative effects of senators placing themselves, rather than the nominees, in the
confirmation hearings’ limelight. If the purpose of confirmation hearings is to
determine the qualifications of a nominee and ensure that he or she is fit for the
Court, then this purpose goes unfulfilled if constituents influence senators’ lines of
questioning. Senators consume themselves with how their constituents back home
will view their questioning and fail to focus on what is at stake—the confirmation
of the nation’s next Supreme Court justice. If the purpose of confirmation hearings
is to evaluate the nominee, then this purpose would best be served by having
undivided attention focused on the nominee and his or her answers. If senators have
an ulterior motive—engaging in an open dialogue with their constituents—then the
confirmation process does not effectively serve its primary purpose.
Part I of this Note investigates the confirmation and appointment power that the
Constitution delegates to the Senate. Part II provides a detailed history of the
confirmation process and its dramatic evolution over the last century, which is
crucial in order to fully comprehend today’s process and its problems. Part III, after
examining the media’s role within the confirmation process and the publicity that
the confirmation hearings attract, offers proof that senators are cognizant of their
national audience and highlights specific examples of senators addressing their
constituents via the confirmation hearings. Part IV concludes by setting forth three
possible solutions to the overarching problem: implementing anonymous
questioning of the nominees through Committee representatives; appointing experts
to question the nominees in the senators’ places; and replacing video recording of
the hearings with audio recording.
I. THE SENATE’S ADVICE AND CONSENT POWER
Before critiquing the Senate Judiciary Committee’s participation in the Supreme
Court confirmation process, the Senate’s role within the process must be
understood. The Senate derives its power to participate in the process under Article
II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which states, “[The president] shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of
the supreme Court.” 8 This is the only sentence that directs the Senate’s conduct
throughout the confirmation process; there is no useful, supplemental statutory law
or set of rules governing the substantive aspects of the confirmation hearings. 9 The

7. During the drafting of this Note, Professor Geyh once commented, “Proposing that
Senators stop being political is a bit like proposing that raccoons start shaving—not only is it
unrealistic to expect, it runs counter to nature and history.”
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. For a detailed discussion of the history of the Appointments
Clause, see Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”:
A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2005).
9. See E. Stewart Moritz, “Statistical Judo”: The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in the
Judicial Appointment Process, 22 J.L. & POL. 341, 352 (2006) (“The Judiciary Committee
also has its own set of rules, but they are also very simple and not relevant to the important
issues concerning nominations.”); see also ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS
13 (1997) (arguing that the criteria for evaluating a nominee “are not carved in stone or even
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lack of direction and clear guidance regarding the Senate’s role in the confirmation
process may be the reason senators have the opportunity to abuse the process. 10
A. Original Framers’ Intent of the Power
An examination of the historical records reveals that there is “little evidence
indicating the exact meaning of ‘advice and consent’ intended by the Framers.” 11
Rather than focusing on the necessary qualifications of justices, delegates to the
Constitutional Convention were more concerned with who would have the power to
appoint justices. During the convention, three opinions surfaced regarding the
process for appointing judges: one group suggested that the national legislature
possess the sole power to appoint justices, 12 a second group proposed that the
president should appoint members to the High Court without any input or action
from the Senate, 13 and a final group advocated for nomination by the president with
the requirement that the Senate acquiesce to the nomination. 14 No group won. 15

drawn in sand”); id. at 9 (stating that the Constitution does not state the standards for
nomination and approval of Supreme Court nominees).
10. KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 13 (“Throughout our nation’s 200-year history, the
standards for confirmation have been the assertions of the Senate at the particular moment it
considers a nominee.”).
11. Lee Renzin, Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction—Is Judicial Resolution
Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1739, 1753 (1998).
12. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 177 (2006). This proposal, referred to as the
Virginia Plan, was “resoundingly rejected” within a week. Id. The primary concern was that
a danger of “intrigue and partiality” existed if the sole power of judicial nomination was
granted to the legislature. Id. (quoting JAMES MADISON, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION]). James Madison pointed out that legislators were not familiar with the
necessary qualifications of judges and would be predisposed to appoint fellow legislators.
See id. On June 13, 1787, James Madison proposed that only the Senate, rather than the
entire legislature, have the sole power to appoint justices. Id. The delegates to the convention
approved Madison’s proposal by a vote of six to three; however, the issue was later
revisited. Id. Madison later came to question his own proposal and realized its weaknesses.
See id. at 177–78, 183.
13. Id. at 178. This proposal was known as the New Jersey Plan and never received the
positive reception that the Virginia Plan had originally received. See id. Delegates to the
convention feared that granting sole power to the president created the risk that the president
would only appoint justices from his home state or that he, as an individual, would be
persuaded by “caresses and intrigues” that the senate as a multi-member body would not be
affected by. Id. (quoting 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 81).
Due in large part to these concerns, the motion to grant the president sole authority to
appoint justices to the Court was rejected by a vote of six to two. Id.
14. Id. at 179. Nathaniel Gorham originally introduced this proposal after noting that
this system had worked seamlessly in appointing judges to the state bench in Massachusetts.
Id. After Gorham’s proposal failed with a tie vote, James Madison altered Gorham’s
proposal and suggested that the president should nominate a judge, and that that judge would
become appointed unless two-thirds of the senate disagreed with the appointment within a
certain number of days. Id. Delegates to the convention were not satisfied by Madison’s
proposal because it essentially vested all of the appointment power with the president. See
id. Madison’s amended proposal was shot down by a vote of six to three. Id. at 183.
15. See id. at 177–80.
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Throughout the Constitutional Convention, delegates voted on the numerous
proposals for the appointment process. 16 While members of the convention
originally voted six to three in favor of granting exclusive appointment power to
the Senate, 17 the Committee of Eleven 18 subsequently amended this decision in
order to resolve lingering disputes. 19 The Committee of Eleven proposed the power
currently found in the Constitution, and those originally in favor of granting the
exclusive power to the Senate had a change of heart—the delegates unanimously
approved the Committee of Eleven’s new proposal. 20 This final solution was
thought to have created a balance: “[A]s the President was to nominate, there
would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be
security.” 21
Regardless, the Framers did not have a clear intent in delegating power to the
Senate in the confirmation process. 22 Since some delegates to the convention had
been willing to grant the president exclusive authority of the appointment power
and some delegates were willing to grant that very same power to the Senate, “[i]t
is thus reasonable to suspect that the ‘original understanding’ of the Senate’s role in
rendering advice and consent would vary depending on whether the delegate one
asked envisioned a process that minimized Senate interference with presidential
prerogatives or one that maximized the Senate’s capacity to check presidential
power.” 23 However, considering the fact that delegates to the convention had
previously voted six to three to grant exclusive power to the Senate and also voted
six to two in opposition of granting the exclusive power to the president, it is
highly unlikely that the delegates to the convention expected the Senate to take a
passive or silent role in the confirmation process. 24 These delegates, who
subsequently voted in favor of the clause currently found in the Constitution,
wanted the Senate to play a purposeful and meaningful role in the process. 25
B. The Senate’s Role in the Process
“Although there are some suggestions in the early history of the national
government that the Senate’s role was only advisory, upon examination it is clear

16. Id.
17. Id. at 183.
18. The Committee of Eleven consisted of one delegate from each state present at the
Federal Convention. MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME
COURT NOMINEES 22 (2004).
19. See GEYH, supra note 12, at 180.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 539)
(alteration in original).
22. COMISKEY, supra note 18, at 22; Renzin, supra note 11, at 1753–54.
23. GEYH, supra note 12, at 181.
24. Id. at 183; James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme
Court Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 354 (1989) (“A merely advisory role would be
inconsistent with the compromise on the Appointment Clause reached in the last days of the
convention.”).
25. Gauch, supra note 24, at 354–55.
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that the Framers intended the Senate’s check to involve a vigorous review of
judicial nominees.” 26 The Framers expected the Senate to use great discretion in
consenting to nominees, and they expected both political and economic interests to
be intertwined with the confirmation process. 27 After all, both interests weighed
heavily in the Framers’ debate over who should receive the appointment power in
the first place—the Framers “did not trust future generations to behave in a more
high-minded way than they themselves did.” 28 The Framers spent extensive time
contemplating whom to authorize with the appointment power because it was an
issue that was important to them; they wanted to ensure that whatever process they
finally settled on would result in the appropriate people being appointed to the
federal bench. 29 Based on this history, the Senate should subject each nominee to
the highest level of scrutiny in determining whether that nominee should be
appointed to the High Court. 30 As Senator Patrick Leahy once stated, “If the Senate
fails to take its advice and consent role seriously . . . it abdicates its duty to
guarantee . . . the rights of our citizens.” 31
According to Professor William G. Ross, the Senate has five functions within
the confirmation process: 1) to review and investigate the qualifications of the
nominee, including the nominee’s intellectual, professional, physical,
psychological, moral, and ethical qualifications; 2) to serve as a check on
presidential favoritism; 3) to evaluate both the political and judicial philosophies of
the nominee; 4) to interview the nominee; and 5) to serve as an open forum for the
expression of views on the nomination by members of the bar, special interest
groups, and private citizens. 32 The focus of this Note assesses the Senate’s
performance of the fourth function. Ross also states that nominees attend their
confirmation hearings for three primary reasons. First, a nominee’s testimony helps
senators evaluate a nominee’s political, social, and judicial views. 33 Second, the
hearings provide a nominee with the opportunity to respond to any questions or
allegations concerning his character, judicial record, or philosophy. 34 Third, the
appearance of the nominee at his own confirmation hearings facilitates a dialogue
between senators and the nominee. 35
These purposes of the confirmation hearings make it clear that senators should
intensely and aggressively question a nominee for the sake of evaluating the
nominee’s fitness for the Court. 36 “Not even the most renowned, respected, or

26. Id. at 353.
27. COMISKEY, supra note 18, at 22–23.
28. Id. at 23.
29. See GEYH, supra note 12, at 178–83.
30. Id. at 183 (arguing that the Founders “wanted an appointments process that would
produce judges selected on the basis of their ‘intrinsic merit’ . . . rather than their political
connections, family ties, or personal friendships”).
31. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-15, at 98–99 (1991).
32. William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme
Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633, 634–35 (1987).
33. Id. at 669.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Dennis DeConcini, Examining the Judicial Nomination Process: The Politics of
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experienced nominee should be presumed fit for the nation’s highest bench and be
permitted to escape the scrutiny that interrogation by the Committee affords.” 37
Senators have an important obligation to the American people to ensure that the
Court’s next appointee is qualified and capable of serving as a life-tenured justice
on the country’s most important bench. 38 Senators should take this duty seriously
and focus their undivided attention on the issue at stake. To put it differently,
senators should press nominees and not allow their constituents to influence their
performance within a confirmation hearing.
At a very simple level, confirmation hearings currently proceed as follows:
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee individually question the nominee,
hear testimony from various interest groups, and provide either a positive or
negative recommendation of the nominee to the Senate. 39 The Committee’s
recommendation carries great weight within the Senate—“[n]o nominee to the
Supreme Court has been confirmed after receiving a negative recommendation
from the committee.” 40 The nominee needs a simple majority to reach confirmation
as the next justice of the Supreme Court. 41
The Senate’s role within the confirmation process is one without boundaries or
restrictions. The Constitution does not state which qualifications members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee should look for in future justices or what specific
purpose the public confirmation hearings should fulfill. 42 However, one thing will
soon be clear: members of the Senate Judiciary Committee take advantage of the
opportunities confirmation hearings provide by addressing their constituents, which
takes away from the energy they can direct towards the nominee. 43
II. EVOLUTION TO PRESENT-DAY CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
Though the Supreme Court confirmation hearings have followed the same
format in recent years, the modern-day process is somewhat new. In fact, the
Senate conducted the confirmation process much differently just six decades ago. 44
Besides the obvious increase in media attention and publicity that the hearings have
received since 1981, 45 the fundamentals of the process have also drastically
changed. A thorough understanding of this historical transformation helps explain
the new opportunities available to senators during present-day confirmation
hearings.

Advice and Consent, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992).
37. William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for a
Synthesis, 57 ALB. L. REV. 993, 1005 (1994).
38. See DeConcini, supra note 36, at 2–3.
39. See THOMAS G. WALKER & LEE EPSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 44–46 (1993).
40. Id. at 46 (“The only justice to be confirmed with less than a positive
recommendation was Clarence Thomas, over whom the committee was divided 7–7.”).
41. Hon. John Cornyn, Standards for the Supreme Court, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 971, 975
(2005).
42. See supra note 9.
43. See infra Part III.C.
44. See infra Part II.D.
45. See infra Part III.A.
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A. First Public Hearing & First Appearance by a Nominee
Supreme Court nominees have not always received the immense attention that
they now receive. 46 Not only were hearings held in private, but the Senate Judiciary
Committee did not require (and usually did not even request) nominees to testify. 47
Needless to say, this process did not provide members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee an opportunity to reveal their own beliefs regarding hot-button issues or
send signals to their constituents.
Originally, not all nominees passed along to the Senate warranted a hearing;
confirmation hearings only took place if the Senate Judiciary Committee believed
the president made a controversial nomination. 48 The Senate typically approved or
rejected nominees—though most commonly approved 49—by a simple yes or no
vote without a hearing. 50 Though rare, when the Committee held a hearing, they
did so behind closed doors unless two-thirds of the Senate voted to make the
hearing public. 51 This trend continued until 1929, when the Senate chose to make
confirmation hearings open to the public unless a majority of the Senate voted to
keep them private. 52 Perhaps more surprisingly, nominees did not appear at their
own confirmation hearings to testify before or answer questions from senators. 53
“[E]ven though everybody wanted to know how potential Justices might vote [on
future cases before the Court], to ask was considered unseemly.” 54 Two nominees,
however, served as exceptions to these otherwise simple confirmation rules: Louis
Brandeis in 1916 and Harlan Fisk Stone in 1925.
In 1916, the nomination of Louis Brandeis shook the confirmation process as
the country had previously known it because the Committee held, for the first time,
a public hearing to discuss Brandeis’s nomination. Brandeis was the first Jewish
man nominated to the Court, and many questioned whether he could overcome his
“handicap of being a Jew.” 55 Brandeis faced strong opposition. 56 Former

46. WALKER & EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 44 (“Today we take these hearings for
granted. We expect to see excerpts of the hearings on the television news and read press
accounts of how the nominee performed. It should be kept in mind, however, that public
hearings are a relatively modern phenomenon.”).
47. See id. (pointing out that, as late as 1949, it was not the norm for nominees to appear
before the Committee).
48. GEORGE WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 142 (1995).
49. See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 379–88 tbl.4-15 (4th
ed. 2007). Prior to 1929, the Senate had confirmed eighty-one of the presidents’ Supreme
Court nominees, while only rejecting seven. Id.
50. All Things Considered: A History of Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings (Nat’l
Pub. Radio broadcast July 12, 2009) (Guy Raz, host; interview with Professor Lucas Powe).
51. Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1146, 1157 (1988).
52. COMISKEY, supra note 18, at 13–14.
53. CARTER, supra note 3, at 65–66.
54. Id. at 65.
55. THOMAS KARFUNKEL & THOMAS W. RYLEY, THE JEWISH SEAT: ANTI-SEMITISM AND
THE APPOINTMENT OF JEWS TO THE SUPREME COURT 44 (1978).
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Republican President William Taft famously called Brandeis a “muckraker,” an
“emotional socialist,” and “unfit for the post.” 57 Opponents of Brandeis did not
hide their feelings, and multiple rumors surfaced that cast Brandeis in a negative
light. 58 Despite President Woodrow Wilson’s public statement endorsing Brandeis
as “eminently qualified” to sit on the Supreme Court, 59 the Senate Judiciary
Committee, for the first time in the Committee’s history, held an open, public
hearing to discuss the nomination. 60 Brandeis did not appear at his confirmation
hearings and avoided questions by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 61 Eventually,
Brandeis passed the Senate vote by a convincing forty-seven to twenty-two margin
on June 1, 1916. 62
Nine years later, in 1925, Harlan Fiske Stone was the first Supreme Court
nominee to appear at his confirmation hearing. 63 Some senators considered Stone a
controversial nominee because he, while serving as attorney general, refused to
dismiss a criminal prosecution against Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler. 64 To
address the concerns of the Committee, Stone volunteered to appear at his own
hearing. 65 As a bright legal mind, Stone answered the Committee’s questions with
great skill, and he eventually passed confirmation with an easy seventy-one to six
vote. 66
An examination of the original confirmation hearings process (or lack thereof)
and a look at the events surrounding the confirmations of Louis Brandeis and
Harlan Fiske Stone reveal that Americans have not always put senators under a
public microscope as they question and decide whether to confirm a nominee to the
High Court. Simply put, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have not
always had an audience and, thus, have not always faced the temptation to use the
confirmation process for their own personal gain. 67 Unfortunately, as the process
evolved, so too did the opportunity for senators to treat this important process as a
56. GEYH, supra note 12, at 199.
57. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 55, at 48–49 (“[Taft] wanted the seat himself, and
if he could not have it, at least he wanted someone whom he regarded as ‘appropriate,’ for
he was more than aware of the role that a conservative Court would play in checking the
flood of progressive legislation.”).
58. See id. at 53–54 (stating that opponents of Brandeis accused him of deserting a
client, conspiring with one of the heirs to the Warren estate to defraud the other inheritors,
and settling a breach of promise suit against the president but charging a seat on the Court as
his fee).
59. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 55, at 56.
60. A History of Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, supra note 50.
61. Id.
62. See KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 55, at 57–58.
63. See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33225, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS, 1789–2006: ACTIONS BY THE SENATE, THE
JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE,
AND
THE
PRESIDENT
7
(2006),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33225.pdf.
64. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 48, at 144.
65. WALKER & EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 44.
66. CARTER, supra note 3, at 66.
67. See GEYH, supra note 12, at 187 (“Until 1929, the Senate deliberated the fate of
judicial nominations in executive session and published records of little more than the final
vote taken.”).
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public forum to express their own political beliefs and, consequently, take the focus
away from the nominees. 68
B. Mandatory Hearings and Invitations to Testify
After the unordinary confirmation hearings of Brandeis and Stone, the
confirmation process reverted to its previous state 69—hearings were optional, and
the nominees were not expected to appear if the Senate Judiciary Committee
decided to hold hearings. 70 The two most controversial hearings of the next stage of
the confirmation evolution were those of Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter. Both
confirmations tweaked the confirmation process and continued the movement
towards the confirmation hearings as they currently stand.
In 1937, the confirmation of Hugo Black triggered the rule that the Senate must
hold a hearing to discuss a president’s nomination. 71 Prior to his nomination, Black
represented Alabama in the United States Senate. 72 The Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Henry Ashurst, thought a referral of the nomination to the
Committee was unnecessary; 73 however, the Committee denied his motion to
bypass the Committee’s approval. 74 The Senate Judiciary Committee never held a
confirmation hearing to discuss Black’s qualifications, 75 but it was this lack of a
hearing that revealed the necessity to hold one in subsequent nominations. After the
Committee received the nomination, Ashurst forced the nomination through the
Committee without ever holding a hearing. 76
Unfortunately, the importance of holding a hearing did not surface until after
both the Committee and the full Senate confirmed Justice Black. Shortly after
confirmation, news reports surfaced that Black had previously and continued to
maintain ties with the Ku Klux Klan. 77 These allegations against Black took a
backseat after Black proved himself as a strong justice and contributor on the

68. See infra Part III.C.
69. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE 20
(2010) (“Neither the Brandeis nor the Stone hearings . . . served as binding precedents.
Public confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominations did not become a regular
practice of the Judiciary Committee until the late 1930s.”).
70. Id.
71. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 48, at 142.
72. Id.
73. See HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 94 (1996) (“Ashurst
asked for immediate confirmation, consistent with the practice of senatorial courtesy.”).
74. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 48, at 142.
75. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31989, SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE 20
(2010). It had been tradition for senators to be confirmed to judicial office without any
debate. BALL, supra note 73, at 94.
76. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 48, at 142.
77. Id. While Black regretted joining the Ku Klux Klan, he once stated, “I would have
joined any group if it helped get me votes.” BALL, supra note 73, at 16, 50 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 100 (1994)).
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bench. 78 Specifically, in Chambers v. Florida, 79 Justice Black’s decision to rule for
an African American criminal defendant eased concerns that he was a bigot. 80
Regardless, the regret of not fully exploring these allegations prior to Black’s
confirmation resulted in the Senate’s adoption of a rule mandating that the Senate
Judiciary Committee hold a hearing to discuss all nominations. 81
Though hearings were now mandatory after Black’s confirmation, the Senate
Judiciary Committee still did not require the nominee to appear and testify; 82
however, in 1939, Felix Frankfurter defended himself at his own confirmation
hearing. 83 Like Brandeis and Stone, senators viewed Frankfurter as a dangerous
candidate. 84 Frankfurter cofounded the American Civil Liberties Union and also
came forward and advocated for a new trial for Ferdinando Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo Vanzetti after they received the death penalty for murder. 85
Additionally, Frankfurter was Jewish and many senators found it unsettling to have
two sitting Jewish justices on the Supreme Court. 86 As a result, the Committee held
hearings to discuss Frankfurter’s confirmation. 87 Instead of attending the
confirmation hearings, Frankfurter continued to teach at Harvard, while Dean
Acheson attended on his behalf. 88
Though much of the disapproval surrounding Frankfurter derived from absurd
accusations, 89 one senator on the Committee vehemently opposed Frankfurter’s
confirmation. 90 Senator Pat McCarran possessed a “deep hatred of leftists, liberals,
Easterners, intellectuals, and Harvard faculty members. Frankfurter qualified on all
counts by his definition.” 91 Noticing this potential roadblock in Frankfurter’s
confirmation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s press secretary requested that
Frankfurter attend the hearings and speak with Senator McCarran. 92 Frankfurter
obliged, and he “put on the greatest lecture of his career.” 93 The audience gave

78. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 48, at 142–43.
79. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
80. BALL, supra note 73, at 104–05.
81. See RUTKUS, supra note 75, at 20 (stating that the Senate held a confirmation
hearing for every nominee beginning with Stanley F. Reed in 1938, except for two senators
nominated to the Court in the 1940s and two nominees who had their nominations
withdrawn in 2005).
82. KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 20 (stating that the Senate Judiciary Committee began
the practice—if not yet tradition—of questioning nominees in 1939).
83. WALKER & EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 44.
84. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 55, at 89.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 94.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 95 (“[T]here was Charles Carraway, a carpenter by trade, who said that if
Frankfurter was confirmed it would encourage aliens to come to the United States on the
expectation that they would get good jobs.”).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 96.
92. Id.
93. Id. (noting that Frankfurter responded to one of Senator McCarran’s comments by
stating, “Senator, . . . you have never taken an oath to support the government of the United
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Frankfurter a two-minute ovation for his presentation to the Committee, and
Frankfurter passed both the Committee and the full Senate unanimously. 94
The nominations and subsequent confirmations of Hugo Black and Felix
Frankfurter transformed the confirmation process. Though more changes would
take place in the coming decades, these two nominations established two
principles: 1) the Senate Judiciary Committee must hold hearings for each nominee
and 2) nominees should appear at their confirmation hearings. 95 These two
principles are now fundamental to the confirmation process, and their
implementation led to the issues inherent in today’s confirmation hearings.
C. Refusing to Testify
The confirmation process of Sherman Minton in 1949 reveals that the Senate
Judiciary Committee did not yet view a nominee’s testimony as a crucial step in the
confirmation process. The Senate Judiciary Committee allowed Sherman Minton to
refuse to testify at his confirmation hearing. 96 Minton had made comments
publicly, stating that some form of check upon the Supreme Court should exist,
which resulted in some senators’ desire to question Minton. 97 After receiving an
invitation to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Minton refused, stating
that “personal participation by [a] nominee in the committee proceedings relating
to his nomination presents a serious question of propriety.” 98 Minton believed his
record as both a U.S. senator and judge for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit revealed all the Committee needed to know about his
qualifications. 99
The fact that Sherman Minton refused to appear at his own hearings and,
perhaps more shockingly, that the Senate Judiciary Committee allowed him to
refuse to appear is difficult to believe considering the current structure of
confirmation hearings. If a nominee in today’s confirmation world refused to testify
in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate probably would not approve
that nominee for appointment to the Court. 100

States with less reservation than have I, nor do I believe that you are more attached to the
principles and policies of Americanism than I am.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
94. Id. at 96–97.
95. However, it was still not custom for every nominee to testify at his hearing. See
KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 21 (“After the Harlan confirmation hearing [in 1955], the
Senate Judiciary [Committee] would call every nominee to testify.”).
96. William G. Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate
Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and
Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. 109, 118 (1987).
97. Id. (“Although Minton made the speech as an ardent New Deal Senator in June
1936, his remarks still concerned a number of Senators.”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 118–19 (stating that Minton claimed he “had left politics behind when he
became a judge”).
100. See RUTKUS, supra note 69, at 21 (“Whereas, historically, nominees were routinely
uninvolved in the appointment process, they have now become active participants. Indeed, at
hearings, a nominee’s demeanor, responsiveness and knowledge of the law may be crucial in
influencing the committee members’ and other Senators’ votes on confirmation.”).
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D. Post-Brown and Mandatory Testimony
John Marshall Harlan’s nomination in 1955 established the routine of mandating
nominees to appear and testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 101 Angry
over the recent Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education 102 and
realizing, perhaps for the first time, the immense power the Supreme Court
possessed, southern senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee demanded that
Harlan explain his specific views on (de)segregation. 103 Liberals on the Committee
worried that such an imposition threatened judicial independence. 104 However,
Harlan eventually agreed to appear in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 105
The confirmation of Justice Harlan created a new tradition. Harlan’s
confirmation hearing laid the foundation for the present-day interrogations that
occur at confirmation hearings. According to Professor Stephen Carter, for more
than the next decade, “every nominee appeared and every nominee was grilled
about the segregation decisions. As the era of the Warren Court continued, the
questioning broadened, and potential Justices found themselves asked about their
views on everything from communism to defendants’ rights to prayer in the public
schools.” 106 Since Harlan’s public confirmation hearing in 1955, every nominee
has testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 107 Looking back, Harlan’s
hearing set the stage for what became the contemporary process. 108 Though
changes continued to occur, this 1955 confirmation process cemented the
procedural aspects of the Senate’s power under Article II, Section 2. 109
Though it is easy to assume that the confirmation hearings of Robert Bork and
Clarence Thomas most impacted the modern concept of confirmation hearings, 110
the impact of this 1955 confirmation process cannot be ignored. This confirmation
hearing forced senators to realize the importance of the confirmation process and
its importance in assessing a nominee’s judicial philosophy and overall
temperament. Senators, as a result of not wanting to confirm a justice without
learning of his personal views regarding segregation, utilized the questioning phase
as a way to receive answers to the questions they needed to know. 111 This is a
crucial distinction from recent confirmation hearings. In 1955, senators questioned
the nominee to assess his credentials and fitness for the Court. It was about the
nominee, and only about the nominee. As part of this Note’s argument, it is

101. CARTER, supra note 3, at 66; KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 18.
102. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
103. CARTER, supra note 3, at 66.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 67.
107. Ross, supra note 96, at 119 (“Testimony by nominees has become an integral part of
the confirmation process.”).
108. RUTKUS, supra note 69, at 21 (“[H]earings in 1955 on the Supreme Court
nomination of John M. Harlan marked the beginning of a practice, continuing to the present,
of each Court nominee testifying before the Judiciary Committee.”).
109. KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 21–22.
110. See infra Part II.E.
111. CARTER, supra note 3, at 66.
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imperative to recognize that the 1955 hearing fulfilled the intended purpose of the
confirmation hearings—to evaluate a nominee’s ability to serve on the High Court,
absent any ulterior motive. As will be made clear in Part IV, throughout the next
fifty-five years senators have sacrificed this original purpose by using the
confirmation hearings in another fashion that helps accomplish their own personal
agenda. 112
E. Getting “Borked” 113 and Thomas’s Spectacle
Though the confirmation hearings in 1955 set the structure, two additional
confirmation hearings helped revolutionize the process. The confirmation hearings
of Robert Bork in 1987 and Clarence Thomas in 1991 accomplished something that
previous hearings failed to do—they made the confirmation process interesting. 114
Since Sandra Day O’Connor’s confirmation hearing in 1981, all confirmation
hearings have been televised. 115 The addition of television cameras, coupled with
the drama of the Bork and Thomas hearings, contributes to the issue highlighted by
this Note. 116
In 1987, President Ronald Reagan nominated Robert Bork to the Court, which
resulted in public outcry. 117 Many considered Bork too extreme to occupy the seat
previously held by Justice Lewis Powell, especially due to Justice Powell’s status
as a consistent swing vote. 118 In particular, Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts
declared:
Robert Bork’s America is a land in which women would be forced into
back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters,
rogue police could break down citizens’ doors in midnight raids,
schoolchildren could not be taught about evolution, writers and artists
would be censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the

112. See infra Part IV.
113. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the verb “Bork” has the following
definition: “To defame or vilify (a person) systematically, esp. in the mass media, usually
with the aim of preventing his or her appointment to public office; to obstruct or thwart (a
person) in this way.” Bork Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/251270?redirectedFrom=Bork#eid.
114. See RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE
MEDIA 21 (2011) (“The high drama of the confirmation hearings attracted television cameras
and tables filled with reporters from various news organizations taking notes on the
proceedings.”); Walter Goodman, Next Act in Drama Fails to Disappoint, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1991, at A17.
115. RUTKUS, supra note 69, at 21 (“In 1981, Supreme Court confirmation hearings were
opened to gavel-to-gavel television coverage for the first time, when the committee
instituted the practice at the confirmation hearings for nominee Sandra Day O’Connor.”).
116. See Michael Comiskey, Not Guilty: The News Media in the Supreme Court
Confirmation Process, 15 J.L. & POL. 1, 29 (1999).
117. Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming the Confirmation Process, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
513, 524 (2003).
118. Id. at 524–25; KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 28 (“The fact that Justice Powell, whose
vacancy Bork would fill, was viewed as a centrist swing vote, only raised the stakes.”).
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Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens for
whom the judiciary is often the only protector of the individual rights
that are the heart of our democracy. 119
Needless to say, the confirmation of Bork erupted into an ideological battle over
Bork’s alleged originalist views that many senators considered “outside the
mainstream” of legal thought. 120 Opponents of Bork echoed the same concerns of
Senator Kennedy, and one senator went so far as to say that Bork’s judicial
philosophy mirrored the Dred Scott decision. 121 The astounding number of public,
controversial statements concerning Bork resulted in heightened public interest. 122
Nina Totenberg points out that Bork’s confirmation hearings reveal a perfect
example of public participation in the confirmation process. 123
Similarly, the confirmation process of Clarence Thomas in 1991 also resulted in
widespread public attention after Anita Hill alleged sexual harassment against
Thomas. 124 The public became so invested in the scandalous nature of the
confirmation that a New York Times article boasted, “The Public Broadcasting
Service will have gavel-to-gavel coverage [of the confirmation hearings] with no
commercial interruptions.” 125 Though the amount of attention in Thomas’s
confirmation may resemble that received by Bork, Thomas’s attention derived from
issues that developed in his personal life. 126 The issue of sexual harassment became

119. 133 CONG. REC. 18519 (1987) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy), quoted in
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 268
(1990).
120. Richard Lacayo, David Beckwith & Anne Constable, The Battle Begins: Bork’s
Nomination Is Likely To Stir a Fiercely Political Senate Fight, TIME, July 13, 1987, at 10
(“All at once the political passions of three decades seemed to converge on a single empty
chair: the Supreme Court seat vacated by Lewis Powell . . . .”).
121. Gallagher, supra note 117, at 524 (Senator Paul Simon made these remarks). For
more on the problems associated with the Court’s Dred Scott decision, see Robert A. Burt,
What Was Wrong with Dred Scott, What’s Right About Brown, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1
(1985).
122. In 1971, Bork published “[o]ne of the most intelligently provocative law journal
articles of its time.” ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA 74 (1989). The article may be found at Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
123. KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 18 (stating that Bork’s confirmation hearing lasted
twelve days and included eighty-seven hours of testimony from 112 witnesses, eighty-six of
whom represented interest groups); Gallagher, supra note 117, at 526 (“Considering the
many distortions, omissions, and inaccuracies of Judge Bork’s record made by his critics,
this conclusion is somewhat strange.”).
124. See, e.g., Against Clarence Thomas: Even ‘Don’t Know’ Calls for a ‘No’ Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at A24; Neil A. Lewis, Law Professor Accuses Thomas of Sexual
Harassment in 1980’s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at A1; Michael Wines, Compelling
Evidence on Both Sides, but Only One Can Be Telling Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at
A20.
125. The Hearings on Television, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at B14.
126. See generally TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES: THE
INSIDE STORY OF CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
(1993).
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paramount—those who believed Hill’s testimony opposed Thomas’s confirmation,
while those who believed Thomas’s testimony supported his confirmation. 127
Both of these hearings further transformed the confirmation process because
they made the confirmation of Supreme Court justices appealing to the American
people. In addition, specific attributes of these confirmation processes continued
for future nominees’ confirmation processes—“a lengthy process stretching over
months rather than weeks or days, elongated televised confirmation hearings,
lobbying by various interest groups, and frequent public opinion polls measuring
the public’s views of the nominee.” 128 Of course, one may hope that all Americans
would show interest in an appointment to the High Court; however, the media
circus that surrounded Bork’s and Thomas’s confirmation hearings drew in
audiences that had not previously existed. 129
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVOLUTION
The transformation of the confirmation process since 1955 has altered the way
senators conduct themselves throughout the process. As Professor Stephen Carter
pointed out, “The presence of television cameras probably makes everyone behave
worse.” 130 The members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have realized that the
confirmation hearings provide them with an opportunity of which they can take
advantage—a chance to address the entire country, specifically their home state
constituents, on national television. 131 The nominees are no longer the only people
in the room with something on the line, with something to lose. As wise politicians,
senators exploit the confirmation process and utilize the momentous occasion as a
time to procure more votes. Unfortunately, the confirmation hearings serve as a
campaign platform for senators, and the emphasis of the confirmation hearings no
longer rests entirely on the nominee.
One may dispute this Note’s thesis and argue that senators do, in fact,
participate in the confirmation hearings to examine the qualifications of the next
candidate to the nation’s High Court. Undoubtedly, this is the case; this Note does
not imply that senators disregard the severity and high stakes of the confirmation
itself and attempt to use the hearings solely as a time to campaign. But assessing a
nominee’s qualifications and self-promoting one’s political beliefs are not mutually
exclusive. Both purposes are served (and appear to do so unnoticed)
simultaneously.
A. Media’s Role and the Publicity of Hearings
Since Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s confirmation hearing in 1981, every
Supreme Court confirmation hearing has been nationally televised. 132 The media’s
role in the confirmation process has impacted the way in which hearings’

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See CARTER, supra note 3, at 18.
DAVIS, supra note 114, at 22–23.
Id. at 21–22.
CARTER, supra note 3, at 194.
See infra Part III.B–C.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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participants conduct themselves. 133 Knowing that they have a national audience,
senators now have the incentive to act in a manner that benefits themselves rather
than staying true to the important issues. 134
Professor Stephen Carter has argued that the televised hearings have
overpoliticized and degraded the confirmation process. 135 While Carter
acknowledges that Bork’s confirmation hearings would have occurred regardless of
whether or not cameras were present in the room, he argues that television “gave us
the Bork hearings” and “transformed an inside-the-Beltway ritual into a full-blown
national extravaganza.” 136 Similarly, Carter asserts that the media’s involvement
deflects attention from more important issues. 137 During Thomas’s confirmation
hearings, the sexual harassment allegations made by Anita Hill consumed
Americans so much that they forgot that there were more substantial issues to
address. 138 The examples of Bork’s and Thomas’s confirmation hearings reveal that
the confirmation hearings received national spotlight and taught senators that they
had a national audience during confirmation hearings.
In addition, the media’s new role in the confirmation process has influenced
whether senators vote to approve or reject a Supreme Court nominee. Professors
George Watson and John Stookey argue that televised hearings make the public
more attuned to issues regarding nominees. 139 As a result, this increased media
coverage “effectively introduce[s] constituency opinion into a senator’s
decision-making calculus.” 140
Though there may be disadvantages to the publicity surrounding the
confirmation hearings, some public participation in the confirmation process is
important, 141 and confirmation hearings are likely to continue to receive national
attention. 142 Instead of arguing that the confirmation hearings should take place
behind closed doors, this Note advocates for reform that will strip senators of the
opportunity to exploit the confirmation hearings as their own personal playgrounds.

133. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 9 (“The White House, the
Department of Justice, senators, witnesses, and even nominees now seem tempted to use
televised hearings as a forum for other purposes, ranging from self-promotion to mobilizing
special interest groups in order to influence public opinion.”).
134. See id.
135. Comiskey, supra note 116, at 5.
136. CARTER, supra note 3, at 17.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 18 (“[T]he spectacle was so riveting that most Americans apparently forgot
that there were other issues about the nomination to be debated. Instead, those who believed
Thomas’s testimony seemed to think he should be confirmed and those who believed Hill’s
seemed to think he should not.”).
139. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 48, at 21.
140. Id.
141. COMISKEY, supra note 18, at 75.
142. CARTER, supra note 3, at 194–95.
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B. Senators’ Cognizance of American Audience
It would be naïve to argue that senators are not aware of their national audiences
during confirmation hearings or that senators do not give any credence to the fact
that they have a national audience. Senators acknowledge their live audience
repeatedly throughout the confirmation hearings. 143 In fact, at Justice Kagan’s
hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairperson, Senator Leahy, said, “I urge the
nominee to engage with this Committee and through these proceedings with the
American people.” 144 Similarly, most senators acknowledge during their opening
remarks that Americans view the confirmation hearings to learn about the
nominees. 145 By making such comments, senators emphasize that their role in the
hearings is to act on behalf of the American people, 146 which explains why senators
choose to verbalize their own political beliefs throughout the hearings.
Aside from political theory or ideology, one physical aspect of the confirmation
hearings makes it difficult to argue that senators are not cognizant of the public
nature of the hearings: the excessive number of cameras in the room. 147 When a
picturesque moment takes place, such as the nominee entering the hearing room or
taking the oath prior to testifying, dozens of cameras flash. Throughout the hearing,
photographers fill the area of the room between the senators and the nominee,
requiring all communication between the senators and nominee to essentially go
through the media. 148 The press does not go unnoticed by the senators. Senator
Cardin joked during Justice Kagan’s hearing, “[W]e did not have quite as much
media attention at [the hearing to confirm Kagan as Solicitor General].” 149
After highlighting the senators’ cognizance of their national audiences during
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, this Note examines how senators turn the
nominee’s spotlight into their own in an effort to procure more votes from their
constituents and to voice their own political beliefs for personal gain.

143. In his opening remarks to Justice Kagan, Senator Franken stated, “Before I joined
the U.S. Senate, I watched every televised confirmation hearing . . . .” The Nomination of
Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 48 (2010) [hereinafter Confirmation
Hearing of Justice Kagan] (statement of Hon. Al Franken, U.S. Senator from Minnesota).
144. Id. at 3 (opening statement of Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Senator from Vermont).
145. See, e.g., id. at 9–10 (statement of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator from Utah);
id. at 17 (statement of Hon. Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Senator from Wisconsin).
146. See, e.g., id. at 36 (statement of Hon. Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator from Maryland) (“I
also will do all I can to ensure that the American people, whether you are watching the
hearing at home, at work or at school, gain a better understanding of how the Supreme
Court . . . really does affect your lives.”); id. at 48 (statement of Hon. Al Franken, U.S.
Senator from Minnesota).
147. Just one photo from Justice Kagan’s confirmation hearing reveals that twenty-two
cameramen were seated between the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Justice
Kagan during her testimony. This photo accompanies Hans von Spakovsky, The End of the
Beginning of the Kagan Hearing, FOUNDRY (June 28, 2010, 9:40 PM),
http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/28/the-end-of-the-beginning-of-the-kagan-hearing/.
148. See supra note 83.
149. Confirmation Hearing of Justice Kagan, supra note 143, at 35 (statement of Hon.
Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator from Maryland).
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C. Senators in the Spotlight: Examples from Recent Hearings
Few things have more of an impact on the American people than the
confirmation of a new justice to the United States Supreme Court. After all, almost
every decision the Court renders directly affects the rights, privileges, and
opportunities of Americans. 150 For this reason, one would expect high stakes during
confirmation hearings and an intense atmosphere surrounding the proceedings.
Unfortunately, senators jeopardize the importance and purpose of these hearings
when they attempt to use the hearings as a public forum to relay their own political
beliefs to their constituents. It is difficult and inefficient to discuss how senators
send political signals to their constituents in the abstract. As a result, this Note
focuses on four examples from the most recent confirmation hearings of Justice
Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan. These examples 151 highlight the
different ways in which senators use the confirmation hearings as an opportunity to
speak to their constituents, rather than as an opportunity to solely question the
integrity and judicial philosophy of a Supreme Court nominee.
Example 1. Senator Coburn: I’ve never walked away from my
conservative positions. I don’t apologize for my social conservatism or
my fiscal conservatism. . . . [Solicitor General Kagan], you have a very
different belief system than most of the people who come from where I
come from. . . . You’re very pro-Choice. . . . You believe in
gender-mixed marriages, or gay marriage. . . . [Y]ou’re different than
me and you’re different than many of the people that I
represent. . . . I’m a proud conservative. . . . I’ll debate anybody about
what I believe and why I believe it . . . . 152
Example 1 provides the ideal (or un-ideal, if you agree with the thesis of this
Note) example of a Senate Judiciary Committee member using the Supreme Court
confirmation hearing as a personal forum to enforce his own political ideology to
his constituents viewing the hearings. Senator Coburn’s remarks do not concern the

150. See generally DeConcini, supra note 36, at 3 (Senator DeConcini states, in noting
that the ramifications of the decision to confirm or reject a nominee are immense, “Supreme
Court justices serve lifetime tenure, making decisions that will affect generations to come.”).
Consider the following cases, which had significant and broad-based implications for the
American people: McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the Second
Amendment is incorporated to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning bans on consensual sex
between adults of the same gender); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (declaring that
George W. Bush had won the 2000 presidential election); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(recognizing that a woman’s decision to have an abortion is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
151. These illustrative examples were selected solely because they further the thesis of
this Note; no consideration was given to the actual views expressed within the examples nor
the political affiliation of the senators that delivered the remarks. It should be noted that the
formatting of these examples has been altered in such a way that an ellipsis may denote an
entirely deleted paragraph.
152. Confirmation Hearing of Justice Kagan, supra note 143, at 174–75.
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qualifications, judicial philosophy, or integrity of Justice Kagan. Rather, Senator
Coburn voices his pride in his strong conservative beliefs. After all, Senator
Coburn has a reputation as a tough Republican in the U.S. Senate. 153 This example
epitomizes the dangerous point that confirmation hearings have reached.
Senator Coburn’s comments to Justice Kagan read much like his own personal
website, which advertises his stance on the controversial issues affecting Oklahoma
voters. According to his webpage, his “priorities” in the Senate include “protecting
the sanctity of all human life—including the unborn—and representing traditional,
Oklahoma values.” 154 Senator Coburn prides himself on his opposition to abortion
and same-sex marriage. Specifically, Senator Coburn informs his constituents via
his personal webpage that he “oppose[s] abortion in all cases, with the lone and
rare exception of when the life of the mother is endangered.” 155 After the Supreme
Court held the Partial Birth Abortion Act to be constitutional, Senator Coburn
released the following statement: “I hope this ruling will challenge all Americans to
consider that children deserve legal protection long before they reach the birth
canal.” 156 As for the issue of same-sex marriage, Senator Coburn cosponsored the
Defense of Marriage Act 157 and has supported a federal constitutional amendment
to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. 158 After voting in favor
of a federal constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage, Senator Coburn
called the institution of marriage “the cornerstone of civilization.” 159
Senator Coburn’s views on these controversial issues are not discussed for any
reason other than to reveal that his comments to Justice Kagan are identical to those
discussed in his personal press releases and posted on his personal website. Like

153. Senator Coburn had become known as “Dr. No” due to his opposition to
government spending. In an interview with Senator Coburn, Fox News Sunday anchor Chris
Wallace asked, “[H]ow tough are you . . . ?” Sen. Coburn Talks Debt and Taxes,
(Dec.
26,
2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-newsFOXNEWS.COM
sunday/transcript/sen-coburn-talks-debt-and-taxes-cardinal-donald-wuerl-religion-andpolitics.
154. About Senator Coburn, TOM COBURN, M.D.: UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM
OKLAHOMA,
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/aboutsenatorcoburn?p=Biography.
155. Legislation & Issues: Sanctity of Life, TOM COBURN, M.D.: UNITED STATES
SENATOR
FROM
OKLAHOMA,
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/?p=SanctityOfLife.
156. Press Release, Tom Coburn, M.D., U.S. Sen. from Okla., Dr. Coburn Commends
Supreme
Court’s
Abortion
Ruling
(Apr.
18,
2007),
available
at
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=05ad4187802a-23ad-4d88-358e21ac2b18&ContentType_id=d741b7a7-7863-4223-99048cb9378aa03a&Group_id=ead5fc45-fbc3-406d-a51d-8b2af15cf314.
157. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
158. Marriage Protection Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 89, 110th Cong. (2008).
159. Press Release, Tom Coburn, M.D., U.S. Sen. from Okla., Dr. Coburn Votes to
Protect
Sanctity
of
Marriage
(June
7,
2006),
available
at
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=af661931802a-23ad-4e5f-65f78539da89&ContentType_id=d741b7a7-7863-4223-99048cb9378aa03a&Group_id=d034d7ac-4245-468d-bdb7-9097f5d5598e.
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his personal webpage or statements made through his own press secretary, Senator
Coburn used the confirmation hearings as an opportunity to make public statements
advancing his own personal agenda and ideology. However, unlike his personal
website or personal comments made through his press secretary, the confirmation
hearings of Supreme Court justices should not be used to relay his views on
controversial issues to his constituents in Oklahoma. There are numerous other
forums (press conferences, debates, public speaking opportunities, etc.) available to
senators that provide them with the opportunity to preach their personal belief
systems in hopes of procuring more votes. The confirmation hearings of Supreme
Court justices are simply not one of these forums.
Though Senator Coburn may have appreciated the confirmation hearings as a
time to evaluate Justice Kagan’s credentials on behalf of his constituents, there is
no denying that the confirmation hearing provided Senator Coburn with a
fifteen-second opportunity to emphasize his right-wing loyalty. And, of course,
Senator Coburn took advantage of this opportunity. His remarks were not necessary
in order for him to adequately question Justice Kagan. They were nothing shy of
superfluous, and one can reasonably view Senator Coburn’s remarks as a way to
remind his constituents of his loyalty to the Republican Party and the fact that he
shares most of his constituents’ beliefs (pro-life, anti-gay marriage, etc.). 160 If
nothing else, Senator Coburn’s comments reveal that the current confirmation
process’s structure provides an ample opportunity for senators to stand on their
soapboxes and actively speak their political beliefs to attract more voters in their
home states. Tolerating such remarks may lead the confirmation process down a
dangerous path that will continue to take the spotlight off of the nominee’s
qualifications and put it on senators’ own political ideology, thus making the
confirmation hearings moot as far as they relate to determining the legitimacy of a
nominee.
Critics of this Note may question whether Senator Coburn’s comments truly
abuse the confirmation hearings. As previously discussed, 161 the questioning of
Supreme Court nominees serves specific purposes. Specifically, senators question
the nominee for the purpose of assessing a nominee’s fitness for the Court. 162
When senators turn the confirmation hearings into their personal lectures, they
sacrifice fulfilling their obligation of thoroughly evaluating a nominee’s
qualifications. Put simply, Senator Coburn, in the example above, wasted some of
his limited time to speak to his constituents rather than solely challenge Justice
Kagan on relevant issues concerning her confirmation. If somebody besides a
senator had questioned Justice Kagan, less time would have been spent serving
senators’ personal motives and more time would have been allotted to challenging
any controversial remarks from Justice Kagan’s past, her record as Solicitor

160. In 2004, 76% of Oklahoma voters supported Question 711, a referendum to approve
an amendment that would prohibit the state from recognizing same-sex marriages or civil
unions. Election Results, CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ba
llot.measures/; see also Wesley Burt, Abortion Remains a Polarizing Issue in Oklahoma,
SOONERPOLL.COM (July 16, 2010), http://soonerpoll.com/abortion-remains-a-polarizingissue-in-oklahoma112/.
161. See supra Part I.B.
162. See supra Part I.B.
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General, and her mysterious judicial philosophy considering that she had no
judicial experience at the time of her nomination. 163 If the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s goal is to investigate a nominee’s social, political, and judicial
views, 164 then the Committee fails to reach that goal when senators turn the
confirmation hearings into their own personally motivated spectacles.
Example 2. Chairman Leahy: I have owned firearms since my early
teen years. I suspect a large number of Vermonters do. I enjoy target
shooting on a very regular basis at our home in Vermont, so I watched
[the] decision [in District of Columbia v. Heller 165] rather carefully and
found it interesting.
Is it safe to say that you accept the Supreme Court’s decision as
establishing that the Second Amendment right is an individual right? Is
that correct? 166
In addition to voicing his own personal views, as in Example 1, Senator Leahy
also used the confirmation hearings as an opportunity to reach common ground
with his constituents by ensuring them he shares their ideals. More specifically,
Senator Leahy relates to his constituents in Vermont who possess firearms for
recreational use. Vermont is notorious for its loose gun control laws. In fact, the
state does not require gun owners to acquire permits or register their firearms, and
the only people who may not own a gun are children under the age of sixteen who
do not have parental consent. 167 Senator Leahy reveals his support of interpreting
and applying the Second Amendment in a way that allows citizens to individually
possess firearms. After the Supreme Court’s holding in Heller, 168 Senator Leahy
wants to ensure that the next justice to the Supreme Court respects the holding as
one that grants individuals the right to possess firearms. Before the Supreme Court
decided Heller, there was probably concern from Vermont gun owners that the
Court’s holding could infringe upon their right to possess firearms. 169 Senator

163. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 9 (pointing out that
senators are “tempted to use televised hearings as a forum for other purposes, ranging from
self-promotion to mobilizing special interest groups in order to influence public opinion”).
164. See supra Part I.B.
165. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
166. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 67 (2009) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing of Justice
Sotomayor]. Two professors recently used this same excerpt to illustrate that public opinion
influences senators’ lines of questioning during Supreme Court confirmation hearings. See
Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lori A. Ringhand, Public Opinion, Precedents, and Supreme Court
Confirmation Hearings, Paper Prepared for Delivery at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the
Southern Political Science Association 3–4 (Jan. 6–8, 2011), available at
http://www.psci.unt.edu/~pmcollins/Collins%20Ringhand%20SPSA%202011.pdf.
167. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4001–4016 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011).
168. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects the rights of
individuals to possess firearms for private use within federal enclaves).
169. See generally Brief for American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) (discussing
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Leahy uses the confirmation hearing as an opportunity to address his constituents
by stating that he supports an interpretation of the Second Amendment that
guarantees an individual the right to bear arms without federal interference. He also
takes the opportunity to convey to his constituents the importance of upholding the
Heller decision.
On his campaign website, Senator Leahy claims to have “praised the Supreme
Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.” 170 Obviously, the purpose of
campaign websites is to allow senators a forum to state their stances on important
issues in hopes of appealing to the voters. For that reason, Senator Leahy found it
important to praise the Court’s decision in Heller. 171 For the same reasons, Senator
Leahy found it self-fulfilling to reiterate his support of the Heller decision during
the confirmation hearing of Justice Sotomayor. Like Senator Coburn in Example 1,
Senator Leahy utilized the confirmation hearings as a means to relay the same
information to his constituents that he relayed via his own personal mediums.
However, his mindset during the confirmation hearings of using the hearings as a
forum to communicate directly to his constituents detracts from the essence of the
confirmation hearings and prevents the accomplishment of their intended purpose.
While opponents of this Note’s theory may argue that Senator Leahy merely
provided a backdrop to his questioning, the question would have been just as
effective had Senator Leahy refrained from declaring his personal affection for gun
rights. Should Senator Leahy expect his pre-question commentary to influence the
response Justice Sotomayor would deliver? 172 Overall, Senator Leahy’s comments
add nothing of substance to the confirmation hearing and do not trigger a special
reaction from Justice Sotomayor; they are merely a way for Senator Leahy to
connect with his constituents and remind them that he has the same position as
them when it comes to gun control laws. This example from Senator Leahy further
reveals that constituents influence senators’ approaches to the confirmation
hearings, and for this reason, the confirmation hearing becomes tampered with
when the party responsible for challenging and evaluating a nominee does not have
complete liberty to do so. The outside pressure from constituents restricts the way
senators behave because senators may feel obligated to reach common ground with
constituents and may avoid more important issues concerning the nominee.
Example 3. Senator Whitehouse: I was talking with some friends in
Providence when I was home about your nomination, and I said, ‘‘It
actually gives me goose bumps to think about the path that has brought
you here today and, more importantly, to think about’’—because it is
not about you—more important to think what that means about
America, that path. And they said, ‘‘No, no. You can’t say ‘goose
the importance of recognizing an individual’s right to possess firearms).
170. Working for the Rights of Every American, LEAHY FOR VERMONT,
http://leahyforvermont.com/issues/?id=0003.
171. Senator Leahy also commended the Court for its decision in McDonald. Press
Release, Patrick Leahy: U.S. Sen. for Vt., On the Supreme Court’s Decision in McDonald v.
City
of
Chicago
(June
28,
2010),
available
at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=76A95A7C-C542-4824-AC9A5E0013DC92A2.
172. This is a question completely distinct from the purpose of this Note though it may
be worthy of discussion at a later point.
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bumps.’ You have to say ‘piel de gachina.’’’ And so I promised them
that I would, so I am keeping that promise right now. 173
As opposed to reinforcing political stances as in the first two examples, senators
may also use their time to make personal shout-outs to their constituents back
home. Such a tactic makes the senator appear charismatic on national television,
and it also shows that the senator listens to his constituents and acts on behalf of his
constituents. In the example above, Senator Whitehouse of Rhode Island makes
comments directly to his constituents before he even begins the questioning phase.
Not only does this emphasize the fact that Senator Whitehouse listens to his
constituents, but it also sets a backdrop to the remainder of his questioning by
outlining that he plans to approach his round of questioning on behalf of his
constituents.
As Rhode Island voters view the confirmation hearing, they should take comfort
in the fact that Senator Whitehouse regularly speaks on behalf of his constituents,
and perhaps more importantly, it reveals to his constituents that Senator
Whitehouse takes time out of his busy schedule to discuss matters such as the
confirmation process with Rhode Island natives. Again, such a tactic interferes with
the confirmation hearings’ original purpose of evaluating the nominee. 174 If
senators focus on appealing to their constituents or sending personal shout outs,
then it is clear that their entire focus is not on the nominee. With the severity of the
situation and the major impact that confirming a Supreme Court justice has on the
American people, senators should place their undivided attention on the nominees
rather than worry about behaving in a manner that attracts potential votes. For this
reason, the purpose of the confirmation hearings would best be served if nominees
were questioned by parties that did not have anything to gain. Senators have their
minds elsewhere as they try to appeal to their constituents, and perhaps more
important issues slip through the confirmation cracks.
Example 4. Senator Grassley: I believe that I’m going to ask you
something that you’ve never been asked before during this hearing, I
hope. I’d like to be original on something.
[Explains Supreme Court holding in Baker v. Nelson. 175]
[D]o you agree that marriage is a question for the States to decide
based on Baker v. Nelson? 176
On April 3, 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court held that denying marriage licenses
to same-sex couples violated the equal protection clause of the state constitution. 177

173. Confirmation Hearing of Justice Sotomayor, supra note 166, at 350.
174. See supra Part I.B.
175. 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (mem.) (dismissing, “for want of a substantial federal
question,” an appeal from the Minnesota Supreme Court, which held that state law limiting
marriage to different-sex couples did not violate the United States Constitution). For the
facts and procedural history of Baker v. Nelson, see Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant,
In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex Marriage, 51 HOW.
L.J. 117, 137–40 (2007).
176. Confirmation Hearing of Justice Sotomayor, supra note 166, at 404.
177. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
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The decision in Varnum v. Brien outraged many Iowans, so much so that three of
the Iowa Supreme Court’s justices were not retained after the 2010 election. 178
Needless to say, the state was divided on this issue and a large portion of the Iowa
population disagreed with the court’s holding. 179
Just three months later, Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa began his questioning
of Justice Sotomayor with the above remarks. Senator Grassley is a proud
Republican senator and opposes same-sex marriage. 180 This example reveals how
senators tailor their questions in a manner that sends subtle signals to their
constituents. By framing his leading question in the affirmative, Senator Grassley
reveals that he believes that marriage is a question for the states to decide—a point
he aims to emphasize to his Iowa voters. The example conveys that senators may
allow their constituents to influence their lines of questioning and essentially strips
senators of the ability to question nominees as U.S. senators entrusted with the
advice and consent power. Instead, senators question nominees as their
constituents’ puppets, and this may result in important issues going unaddressed
throughout a nominee’s confirmation hearings.
As a controversial topic at the forefront of his voters’ minds, Senator Grassley
puts this issue as his primary concern in the confirmation hearing. It is an issue that
concerns his constituents, 181 and Senator Grassley wants Justice Sotomayor to state
that it is up to each individual state to determine to whom marriage licenses should
be granted (or denied). Since Varnum, members of the Iowa state legislature have
proposed legislation that would essentially overturn the court’s holding. 182 Senator

178. O. Kay Henderson, Three Justices Voted Off Iowa Supreme Court, RADIO IOWA,
(Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.radioiowa.com/2010/11/03/three-justices-voted-off-iowasupreme-court/.
179. In 2010, Iowa was the only state that allowed same-sex marriage and had less than
50% public approval for the practice. See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Lax & Justin Phillips,
Over Time, a Gay Marriage Groundswell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at WK3; see also
A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at
A1.
180. Senator Grassley issued the following statement after the Varnum holding:
I also voted twice in 2006, in the Judiciary Committee and on the Senate floor,
for a joint resolution that would have amended the federal Constitution to
define marriage as between one man and one woman. Now, to change what’s
happened with the Iowa Supreme Court decision, the state legislature would
have to take action.
Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Iowa Supreme Court Decision on Gay Marriage (Apr.
3, 2009), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_15
02=20093.
181. Senator Grassley’s opposition to same-sex marriage has not changed since Justice
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing. On July 20, 2011, Senator Grassley commented,
“Marriage is an institution that serves the same public purpose all over the world: to foster
unions that can result in procreation. It creates incentives for husbands and wives to support
each other and their children.” S. 598, The Respect for Marriage Act: Assessing the Impact
of DOMA on American Families: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Hon. Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator from Iowa).
182. See Kathleen Gilbert, Iowa Marriage Defenders Push for Marriage Amendment,
Decry Foul Play in Activist Same-Sex “Marriage,” LIFESITENEWS.COM (Apr. 6, 2009),
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Grassley makes his remarks to remind his constituents that the Iowa legislature
possesses the power to overturn the Varnum holding through legislation, and that
he hopes the legislature will eventually do so. Essentially, Senator Grassley wants
Iowans to realize that he still opposes same-sex marriages, 183 and he wants to
reinforce his belief that the court’s holding in Varnum will not be good law for
much longer and that same-sex marriages will soon be banned again in Iowa. 184
Such a message would resonate well with his voters back home and reaffirms that
Senator Grassley shares their beliefs. 185
This type of questioning is an abuse of the confirmation hearings because
Senator Grassley uses the confirmation hearings as an opportunity to relay to his
constituents his stance on same-sex marriage. If the nominee should be the focus of
the confirmation hearings, then the ability for senators to instead speak to their
constituents disturbs this purpose. Senators attempt to use the confirmation
hearings to advance their own personal agenda, and this motive undoubtedly
interferes with senators’ ability to intensively question a nominee without bias or
outside influence.
D. Specter Treated Bork and Thomas Differently Due to Reelection
In addition to the sound bites throughout a confirmation hearing, an analysis of
a senator’s total behavior towards one nominee compared to a previous nominee
supports the argument that senators use the Supreme Court confirmation process as
their own personal campaign playgrounds. After all, if senators know they have a
national audience, it would not shock the conscience to find that a senator would
cross-examine or treat a nominee differently knowing that his senate seat is up for
reelection soon. 186 The hearing serves as the perfect (in the eyes of the senators)
time to prove party loyalties, address a controversial issue in their home states, or
simply appear charismatic in hopes of securing more votes. Perhaps the best
example of a senator altering his approach to the confirmation hearings close to a
looming election is that of Arlen Specter. The Senator Specter that showed up to
Robert Bork’s hearing in 1989 is almost unrecognizable from the Senator Specter
that appeared at Clarence Thomas’s hearing just two years later in 1991. 187
With experience as a county prosecutor under his belt, Specter’s
cross-examination of Robert Bork helped lead to the nominee’s defeat. 188 Though a

http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2009/apr/09040607
(Family
Research
Council President challenged, “We hope the legislature will heed the powerful swell of
statewide support for an amendment and reclaim from the High Court its rightful place as
the state’s policy making body.”).
183. See supra note 181.
184. Same-sex marriage continues to be legal in Iowa. See Gelman et al., supra note 179.
185. See id. (pointing out that only 44% of Iowa voters support same-sex marriage).
186. Collins & Ringhand, supra note 166, at 9 (“Senators, highly aware of the
importance of reelection . . . must stay in tune with their constituents’ desires in order to
secure reelection.” (citation omitted)).
187. Gallagher, supra note 117, at 559.
188. Gary J. Simson, Thomas’s Supreme Unfitness—A Letter to the Senate on Advise and
Consent, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 619, 646–47 (1993) (stating that Senator Specter’s
questioning “helped trigger Bork’s defeat”).
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Republican, Senator Specter appeared determined not to allow conservative Bork
to reach a seat on the Supreme Court. 189 Specter spent the entire summer prior to
the confirmation hearings reading Bork’s articles and speeches, so that he was the
most knowledgeable about Bork’s beliefs and most prepared for what turned out to
be an interrogation. 190 “It was his questioning, more than anyone else’s, that lent
the hearings the feel of high-minded constitutional debate.” 191 Senator Specter
grilled Bork on Bork’s views of privacy rights, equal protection, and original
intent. 192 Specter questioned Bork in such detail that when the Committee decided
Specter would have to finish his questioning the following day, Specter informed
Committee Chairman Joe Biden that he would need another hour and a half to
finish. 193
Throughout his questioning, Specter repeatedly returned to Bork’s belief in
looking to the original intent of the Framers in interpreting the Constitution. 194
After all, it was this aspect of Bork’s convoluted judicial philosophy that was most
troublesome to senators. 195 Specter exploited this point on national television.
Specter highlighted that many issues arise that could not have been within the
purview of the original Framers. For example, Specter brought up electronic
listening devices, and Bork conceded that judges would have to extend search and
seizure protection to account for such devices. 196 Specter then wondered why that
right could be expanded but not privacy rights, referencing Bork’s stance on the
lack of constitutional protection rights in privacy. 197 Specifically, Specter pointed
out contraceptives and that the original Framers could not have imagined this
advancement in medicine. 198 Bork acknowledged the argument, and for the first
time, admitted that one of his opponents had a valid point. 199 Specter concluded his
questioning by stating that “[t]he hearings present a real opportunity for the
Senators to tell you what is on our minds, and to tell you what is on the minds of
our constituents.” 200 Bork’s nomination was defeated by the Senate and in no small
part due to Specter’s questioning. 201
Fast forward just two years to the confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas.
As Gary J. Simson puts it, “it was difficult to believe that the Specter of the Bork
hearings and the one now before us [in the Thomas hearings] were one and the

189. Id.
190. BRONNER, supra note 122, at 265.
191. Id.
192. Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 429–38 (1987)
[hereinafter Confirmation Hearing of Robert Bork].
193. BRONNER, supra note 122, at 265.
194. Id. at 265–70.
195. See id.
196. Confirmation Hearing of Robert Bork, supra note 192, at 820.
197. Id. at 819–20; see BRONNER, supra note 122, at 273 (“Why, Specter wanted to
know, was the doctrine of original intent sacrosanct regarding the specificity of privacy, but
not so for other areas?”).
198. Confirmation Hearing of Robert Bork, supra note 192, at 820.
199. Id. at 820; BRONNER, supra note 122, at 273.
200. Confirmation Hearing of Robert Bork, supra note 192, at 840.
201. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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same.” 202 Senator Specter, sometimes attacked for being too liberal, 203 revealed his
strong Republican loyalties during the Thomas hearings. 204 Though nothing too
extreme sticks out from Thomas’s original hearing, the same cannot be said for the
second wave of hearings regarding the sexual harassment allegations of Anita Hill.
Senator Specter received the duty of cross-examining Anita Hill, 205 and prior to the
questioning phase, he explicitly stated that his “duties run to the people of
Pennsylvania who have elected [him].” 206
After intensely questioning Anita Hill about her allegedly incomplete statements
to the FBI, 207 her definition of sexual harassment, 208 and her alleged sexual interest
in Clarence Thomas, 209 it was clear to all watching that Specter was putting his
prosecutorial skills to good use. 210 His primary motivation for destroying Anita
Hill’s credibility appeared to be to help get Thomas confirmed, so that he could
then rely on Republican Party loyalties to win reelection 211 In fact, prior to
entering the hearing room that morning, Specter promised one news reporter a
“flat-out demolition of [Hill’s] credibility,” 212 and upon completion of his
questioning, he told a reporter that he was confident “her credibility has been
demolished.” 213
While there may have been other reasons to vote against Bork and in favor of
Thomas, 214 the election facing Specter shortly after Thomas’s hearing should
receive considerable weight when trying to figure out why he treated each nominee

202. Simson, supra note 188, at 646.
203. Senator Specter left the Republican Party and joined the Democratic Party in April
2009. Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney, Specter Switches Parties; More Heft for Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A1.
204. Simson, supra note 188, at 647.
205. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Pt. 4, 102d
Cong. 3 (1991) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing of Justice Thomas] (Senator Hatch was
also chosen to question Anita Hill on behalf of the Republicans).
206. Id. at 58.
207. See id. at 60–62.
208. See id. at 108–11.
209. See id. at 81.
210. Kim A. Taylor, Invisible Woman: Reflections on the Clarence Thomas Confirmation
Hearing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 443, 446 (1993) (“Senator Specter’s background as a prosecutor
enabled him to slide into and out of the roles of prosecutor and judge whenever doing so
served his purpose. For example, Senator Specter posed a series of questions that he believed
demonstrated that Professor Hill had perjured herself.”).
211. See Simson, supra note 188, at 647.
212. Dan Hirschhorn, Reinventing Arlen: One Year After He Fled the GOP, Pa.’s Senior
Senator Is Scratching and Clawing To Do What He Does Best: Survive, PHILA. CITY PAPER,
Mar. 9, 2010, available at http://archives.citypaper.net/articles/2010/03/11/reinventing-arlen.
213. Michael Rubinkam & Laurie Kellman, Voters Turn Away from Party Switcher
PRESS,
May
19,
2010,
available
at
Specter,
ASSOCIATED
http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/politics&id=7449435.
214. For a short list of reasons that senators may have voted against Bork and later voted
to confirm Justice Thomas, see Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the
Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 976–78
(1992).
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so differently. Specter won the 1992 election after capturing only 49.1% of the
votes and narrowly defeating Lynn Yeakel, who carried 46.3% of the votes. 215 This
close election reveals that one slip up on national television during the live hearings
and subsequent replays by news stations could have cost Specter the election. As a
politician, it would be hard to argue that Specter did not think about the upcoming
election and his constituents viewing the hearing while he cross-examined Hill.
Something changed in Specter between Bork’s and Thomas’s hearings, and it is
reasonable to conclude that Specter’s cognizance of his audience during the
Thomas hearing led him to emphasize his party loyalties from his Committee-built
soapbox.
E. Kennedy Supported Scalia to Maintain Italian-American Voters
As noted above, Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts took a lead role in
ensuring that the Senate rejected Robert Bork’s nomination. 216 However, just a year
before attacking Bork, Kennedy questioned right-wing Judge Antonin Scalia
softly. 217 Michael M. Gallagher explains Kennedy’s different treatment of the two
nominees by pointing out that “Senator Kennedy chose not to attack a nominee of
Italian descent, considering that Italian-Americans are an influential constituency in
Massachusetts.” 218
Gallagher’s observation and analysis reveals that reform is necessary to uphold
the integrity of the Supreme Court confirmation process. Ideally, senators would
feel that they have the liberty to ask whatever questions they feel necessary in order
to acquire the information needed to accurately assess a nominee’s fitness for the
Court. The bottom line is that if senators do not feel like they possess such liberty,
they should not be tasked with the responsibility of assessing who is fit for our
nation’s highest court. In this example, Kennedy could have strengthened the
confirmation process had he challenged Scalia as he did Bork, requiring that Scalia
answer difficult legal questions regarding his judicial philosophy and his
interpretation of controversial constitutional questions. Supreme Court seats should
not be handed out to whichever nominee happens to have support because senators
are too cautious (or too scared) to challenge the nominee. In such a system,
unqualified candidates (or at least candidates that deserve more scrutiny) can reach
the Supreme Court without earning the support of the Senate, which has the
constitutional duty to advise and consent to the nominees. Senators fail to carry out
their obligation if they refrain from challenging a nominee due to the potential
repercussions from their constituents.

215. David Leip, 1992 Senatorial General Election Results—Pennsylvania, ATLAS U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?fips=42&yea
r=1992&f=0&off=3&elect=0&class=3.
216. See supra Part II.E.
217. Gallagher, supra note 117, at 560.
218. Id.
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IV. REMEDYING THE PROBLEM
In order to strip senators of the opportunity to send political signals to their
constituents during Supreme Court confirmation hearings, this Note offers three
possible solutions that the Senate Judiciary Committee could implement. These
proposed solutions would allow for the confirmation hearings to serve their
intended purpose of allowing senators to acquire the information they need from
the nominee in order to cast an informed vote. In addition, these proposals would
eliminate senators’ opportunity to abuse the confirmation process and would shift
the spotlight back onto (and ensure that it remains on) the nominees.
A. Appoint Two Representatives of the Committee to Question Nominees
The Senate Judiciary Committee should appoint two members of the Committee
(one Republican and one Democrat) to thoroughly question Supreme Court
nominees on all issues requested by fellow Committee members. Physically
removing the microphones from members of the Committee is the most direct
solution to the problem of senators utilizing the confirmation hearings as a time to
emphasize their own political beliefs. There is no need for all members of the
Committee to question the nominee individually, especially considering that many
senators touch upon the same legal issues and ask similar questions. 219 Of course,
senators will resist any suggestion that they give up their right to question the
nominee individually on national television; 220 however, the senators must make
such a sacrifice to ensure the fulfillment of their constitutional obligation and to
guarantee that the confirmation process effectively serves its purpose.
In practice, this proposed solution would require Committee members to assign
questioning powers to one Republican and one Democrat. Presumably, this power
would be granted to the most senior members of the Committee, but Committee
members may instead grant the power to a senator that possesses the skill set
necessary to effectively question or cross-examine a nominee, such as a senator
with experience as a prosecutor or one with a vast knowledge of constitutional law.
These two representatives would each be given adequate time to touch upon all of
the issues concerning their colleagues. The remainder of the Committee should still
attend the hearing because, after all, it should be the answers to the questions that
the Committee members need in order to make an informed vote in favor or against
confirmation. Allowing senators to remain in the room for the hearing will also
remind the American public that they are represented in the process and that their
elected officials will eventually make a decision with regards to whether the
nominee is fit to sit on the Court. The proposed change would simply make the
questions anonymous in the sense that television viewers will not know which
senators wanted which issues addressed, and thus this proposed change would
prevent senators from sending political signals and will force them to focus solely

219. See KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 42 (“[S]ome senators . . . have criticized repetitive
questions posed by the collective Judiciary Committee.”).
220. See SETH ROSENTHAL, TIRED OF KABUKI? TIME TO TANGO: THE CASE FOR
LITIGATOR-LED QUESTIONING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 5–6 (2007).
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on the qualifications of the nominee. The Committee used a similar format during
the second part of Justice Thomas’s hearings—only representatives received the
duty of questioning Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas. 221
Opponents of this proposal may argue that this change would make
confirmation hearings dry and boring; however, maybe confirmation hearings
should lack entertainment value. 222 Certainly each hearing does not need to play
out like a dramatic daytime soap opera. The stakes are too high. 223 Maybe the
confirmation hearings should be a dense intellectual debate that would not attract
the attention of Americans simply looking to see senators and nominees in an
“intellectual feast.” 224 Maybe these hearings should be reserved for C-SPAN and
not network television. For this reason, it is acceptable to sacrifice the showy
nature of the current hearings for a system that would allow senators to receive the
answers they need to important questions without them polluting the hearings’
effectiveness.
Other opponents may argue that this proposed solution only partially remedies
the central issue because the selected representatives would still have the
opportunity to abuse the confirmation hearings in such a way that allows them to
speak to their constituents. However, senators are less likely to send political
signals to their constituents back home if they are chosen to speak on behalf of the
other senators on the Committee. They will have less personal choice in which
topics they address and how to frame their questions, eliminating the opportunity to
insert their own personal beliefs. There will be a level of accountability, an aspect
that the current process lacks entirely. Rather than lecturing freely, their fellow
senators will define the role granted to them.
Overall, this may be the easiest option to alter the confirmation hearings so that
the emphasis of the hearings shifts back onto the nominees. Senators will not have
the opportunity to question the nominees individually; however, their primary
issues will still be addressed via the questioning power of their chosen
representative. And most importantly, senators will receive the benefit of hearing
the nominee’s responses so that they can assess the credibility and legitimacy of the
nominee prior to casting a vote for or against confirmation.
B. Designating Questioning Power to Experts
Another possible solution to correct the wrong of senators using the
confirmation hearings for personal gain is to force each senator to appoint an
“expert” to question the nominee in his place. Some scholars have already
suggested that law professors or lawyers question nominees rather than senators. 225

221. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
222. Donald J. Devine, Reform the Judicial Nomination Process Now: Five Proposals for
a Return to Senatorial Comity, Address at The Heritage Foundation 4 (Nov. 12, 1991),
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/12724.pdf (“Committee hearings are
(or should be) technical proceedings.”).
223. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
224. See BRONNER, supra note 122, at 261.
225. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 220; Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (1988); Simson, supra note 188, at 656–58; David A. Strauss &
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Most of these scholars advocate for such a change because senators are ill equipped
to cross-examine and challenge Supreme Court nominees. 226 Many senators, these
scholars argue, do not have experience as practicing attorneys and lack the skills
necessary to truly drill the nominees and receive substantive testimony from the
nominees. 227 In addition, many senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee do not
have law degrees, 228 which may render them incapable of effectively challenging a
nominee on Supreme Court precedent, the role of the federal courts, or doctrinal
issues relating to constitutional law. 229 Many questions asked by senators reveal a
lack of understanding of how the federal courts work, which renders the
questioning phase inefficient at times. 230 Also, the nominee is arguably the
brightest legal mind present in the room during the hearings; 231 as a result, the
questioning phase is sometimes an uneven debate. 232 After all, “[t]he Senate is
designed to be a deliberative body, but not necessarily a deeply intellectual one.” 233
As one scholar points out, the problem is not always that senators attend the
hearings without good questions drafted, but rather that senators “often fail to ask
follow-up questions that do a good job of probing a response’s ambiguities and
implications.” 234
For these reasons, the confirmation hearings would be more effective in
determining a nominee’s fitness (or unfitness) for the Court if experts in
constitutional law, federal jurisdiction, or judicial philosophy challenged the
nominees in place of the senators. As the process currently stands, the senators are
tasked with questioning one of the sharpest legal minds in the country and a
Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE
L.J. 1491, 1519 (1992). For a brief counterargument that senators should not be replaced
with law professors or lawyers, see Gallagher, supra note 117, at 591.
226. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 672, 673 (1989) (“The Senate, simply stated, is ill-suited intellectually, morally, and
politically to pass on anything more substantive than a nominee’s professional fitness for the
office of Supreme Court Justice. Because senators tend to be intellectually shallow and
result-oriented, their ostensible inquiries into ‘judicial philosophy’ will almost invariably
degenerate into partisan posturing.”); see also KATZMANN, supra note 9, at 42; Carter, supra
note 225, at 1195 (“Senators and their staff members will not have read deeply or broadly in
the literature on judicial philosophy or adjudication or interpretation; even if they have, they
will be unlikely to have the scholarly turn of mind vital to making sense of it all.”).
227. See Fein, supra note 226, at 673; Simson, supra note 188, at 657.
228. During Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing, there were nineteen members on
the Senate Judiciary Committee, but only thirteen of these Committee members possessed
law degrees. Natasha Metzler, The Confirmation Hearing by the Numbers, YAHOO! NEWS
(July 11, 2009), http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20090711/ts_ynews/ynews_ts434.
229. See Carter, supra note 225, at 1195; Simson, supra note 188, at 657.
230. During Justice Kagan’s hearing, Senator Cornyn admitted that Kagan had “talked
about some legal history that [he’s] vaguely familiar with.” Confirmation Hearing of Justice
Kagan, supra note 143, at 161.
231. During Justice Kagan’s confirmation hearing, Professor Ronald Sullivan testified
that Kagan is an “outstanding legal scholar” with a “first-class mind,” and that “[h]er
academic record is unassailable.” Confirmation Hearing of Justice Kagan, supra note 143, at
355.
232. Carter, supra note 225, at 1195.
233. Id.
234. Simson, supra note 188, at 657.
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nominee who was extensively prepped by White House staff members. 235 “[A]s
long as the Senators are the ones who will be asking the questions, the hearings are
not going to be as informative as [we] need them to be.” 236 To say that senators
cannot succeed in questioning a nominee is not the purpose of this Note; however,
it provides additional support for reforming the process in this regard.
Allowing experts, rather than senators, to question Supreme Court nominees
would strip senators of the opportunity to use the confirmation hearings as a
campaign forum. Since senators may not be the most qualified to challenge
nominees, law professors, seasoned attorneys, and federal agency officials can
stand in the shoes of the senators to guarantee that the nominees are challenged and
less likely to curtail serious questions during the confirmation hearings. In
addition, it is not an uncommon practice to have litigators handle high-profile
congressional hearings. Over the last thirty years, Congress has called on outside
counsel to conduct the following investigations: Watergate, the Iran-Contra
scandal, the Keating Five scandal, and Whitewater. 237 “Outside counsel were given
investigative and interrogatory responsibilities for reasons equally applicable to
Supreme Court nominations: the time they have to absorb the subject matter and
prepare meticulously, and the experience they bring in delivering effective, probing
questions.” 238
Since there are some benefits to giving senators an opportunity to discuss issues
important within their home states, this Note recommends that each senator of the
Senate Judiciary Committee appoint an expert to question the nominee in his place.
This alteration would allow for a senator to select an expert who has similar
ideology to him, and it would also allow for senators to meet with the expert in
advance in order to inform the expert what issues are most important to the senator.
This does not entirely strip the Senate of its advice and consent power—the senator
would still pick representatives to question the nominees, meet with the
representatives to provide a general path of questioning, and, most importantly,
vote on whether or not to confirm a nominee.
Because senators’ staffs are more likely to do the background research on
nominees and draft possible questions than senators, the proposed change is not
taking as much from senators as may be seen at first glance. 239 This proposed
change would simply eliminate the senators’ opportunity to treat the confirmation
hearings as a time to drag out their political soapboxes and guarantee that nominees
receive strict questioning. It is in everybody’s best interest for the nominee to face
a challenge, so it is hard to argue that having experts conduct the questioning phase
would taint the confirmation process in any way—senators and the American
people would receive relevant testimony from the nominee and the nominee would
be subjected to intense scrutiny prior to appointment.

235. RUTKUS, supra note 69, at 28 (noting that the president’s administration assists the
nominee by providing legal background materials and by conducting mock hearing practice
sessions).
236. Simson, supra note 188, at 657.
237. ROSENTHAL, supra note 220, at 7.
238. Id.
239. See Carter, supra note 225, at 1195.
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C. Replace Cameras with Speakers
One last possibility for reform is replacing the video recording of the current
process solely with audio recording. Since senators treat the confirmation hearings
as their own public forums, this problem will be alleviated (if not eliminated) by
banning the existence of cameras from the room entirely. As discussed above, there
is an overwhelming number of cameras present in the hearing room. 240 There are
certainly benefits to having cameras present during the hearings—notably
educating the public and capturing the historic moments for future archival
purposes 241—however, the large number of cameras in the room makes it
impossible for senators to forget the public nature of the hearings. As a senator
questions a nominee, there are dozens of cameras staring him in the face.
Instead of the current system, the confirmation hearings should only be audio
recorded—a system analogous to the approach employed by the Court in the
recording of oral arguments. Eliminating cameras at confirmation hearings would
allow for a more relaxed atmosphere in which senators may be more likely to focus
on their conversations with the nominee, rather than constantly focusing on how
their constituents are interpreting and critiquing their interactions with the
nominee. 242 This approach also preserves the right of the public to become familiar
with a Supreme Court nominee. Although Americans may be less likely to listen to
an audio recording (after all, it is unlikely that anybody besides practicing attorneys
and law students listen to oral arguments), the proposed reform still provides the
American people with the opportunity to do so in order for them to familiarize
themselves with the concerns of senators and the nominee’s testimony. If the
primary goal is to deliver the most effective and promising confirmation process,
then sacrificing video footage of the hearings while allowing for audio recording
would help attain the goal. It is more likely that senators will be more focused on
the task at hand (specifically, questioning the qualifications of a nominee) if there
are not cameras present in the room during the questioning stages of the hearings.
CONCLUSION
After analyzing the Senate’s undefined role in the Supreme Court confirmation
process, the evolution of the confirmation hearings, and the increase in media
attention surrounding the Supreme Court, it is not surprising that the current
confirmation process provides an ample opportunity for senators to speak to their
constituents via national television. Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
have taken full advantage of the opportunity. Throughout confirmation hearings,
senators make multiple statements that they hope will resonate with their
constituents at the expense of scrutinizing Supreme Court nominees to the highest

240. See supra Part III.B.
241. See Confirmation Hearing of Justice Kagan, supra note 143, at 48 (statement of
Hon. Al Franken, U.S. Senator from Minnesota).
242. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 10 (One task force
member suggested further “that television cameras be banned from the hearings. This would
go some way toward getting the senators to attend to the business at hand instead of striking
poses to please their favorite constituents.”).
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degree. These statements may reveal the senator’s position on a controversial issue,
emphasize how loyal the senator is to his political party, or acknowledge his
audience in his home state and the fact that his presence during the hearing is to
serve his constituents, which provides comfort to Americans watching on
television. Regardless of the approach, the primary purpose of the confirmation
hearings should be to determine the qualifications of a Supreme Court nominee,
and for this reason, reform is necessary. Without reform, confirmation hearings of
Supreme Court justices will continue to be “vapid and hollow” and “reinforce
cynicism that citizens often glean from the government.” 243

243. See supra text accompanying note 1.

